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Claudia Rommel 
Economic Partnership Agreements in 
the EU’s post-Lomé Trade Regime:   
Negotiations with West Africa 
Introduction 
Trade is a key element of the development policy of the European Union 
(EU). As the most important trading partner of developing countries, the 
EU attempts to facilitate the participation of developing countries in global 
trade and contribute to economic growth through providing market access 
and financial assistance. For twenty-five years, the commitment of the EU 
was largely focused on its former colonies, more specifically in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). The developing world, in terms of the 
EU’s trade policy, was therefore divided between ACP states with special 
provisions under the Lomé Conventions and all other developing countries. 
With the new millennium, this special relationship came to an end. Pressure 
from several member states
1 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) led 
to an overhaul of the EU’s trade regime vis-à-vis developing countries and 
to the loss of the privileged position of ACP countries.  
The result of this overhaul is still pending. Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs) – to be negotiated between the EU and several ACP regions 
– have only been realized in the Caribbean. This article will to examine the 
 
1   This refers particularly to Germany which lost its right to import bananas duty-free 
from non-ACP countries under the Single European Act in 1993, see Salas, Mauri-
cio & Jackson, John H.: “Procedural Overview of the WTO EC – Banana Dispute”, 
in: Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2000), 145-166. Online 
at: http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/145.full.pdf+html [16.03.2012], p. 147. Claudia Rommel 
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negotiations between the EU and West Africa and discuss the interests in-
volved on the African side.   
Following the introduction, the second part of this article is dedicated to the 
Lomé Conventions with a focus on the change occurring from the third to 
the fourth revision in order to understand the current situation. The third 
part is going to take a look at the Cotonou agreement and the trade regime 
of the EU in general before turning to the negotiations for an Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the EU and West Africa. The conclusion 
summarizes the main findings.  
  Economic Partnership Agreements 
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1.  The relationship between the ACP and the EU under 
the Lomé Convention 
The origins of the special European-African relations date back to the 
common colonial heritage. Before signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
France insisted that its overseas dependencies would also be considered in 
the Treaty and be granted special rights, such as development aid and free 
trade. One year later, the European Development Fund (EDF) was created 
in order to channel financial assistance. However, as more and more former 
colonies gained their independence, the relationship to these countries 
needed a new foundation.
2 The result was the Yaoundé Convention in 
1963, signed by six European and 18 African countries (mainly former 
French colonies).
3 Following the enlargement in 1973 with the accession of 
the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and Denmark, the relationship with the-
se countries was reassessed, as the UK wanted the same favorable treat-
ment for its former dependencies and colonies.
4 The Lomé Convention, 
signed in 1975, would then shape the relationship between the EU
5 and the 
ACP states for the following twenty-five years.  
The Lomé Convention – or rather Conventions as it underwent three revi-
sions
6 – was a mixture between trade and development aid and was based 
 
2   1960 is known as the Year of Africa as 17 countries gained their independence, see 
CBC News: 1960: The Year of Africa (2010). Online at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/06/07/f-year-of-africa.html [30.04.2012]. 
3    See Koulaïmah-Gabriel, Andrea, “Beyond Lomé IV: Future Challenges to EU-
Africa Relations”, in: Review of European Community & International Environ-
mental Law, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1997), pp. 14-22, p. 15; Gibb, Richard, “Post-Lomé: the 
European Union and the South”, in: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2000), 
pp. 457-481, p. 461. 
4   See Koulaïmah-Gabriel, p. 15. However, some former British colonies, such as In-
dia or Bangladesh, were excluded. 
5   Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Community was responsible for trade-
related issues, even so, this article will refer to the European Community and the 
European Union through the acronym EU.   
6   Lomé I lasted until 1980, Lomé II was in place until 1985, Lomé III from 1985 to 
1990 and Lomé IV expired in 2000, see Cosgrove, Carol, “Has the Lomé Conven-
tion Failed ACP Trade?”, in: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 
(1994), pp. 223-249, p. 223 footnote 2. Claudia Rommel 
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primarily on free access of the ACP countries to the market of the EU, 
however, with special arrangements for some agricultural products.
7 It 
raised high expectations and was regarded as a model for North-South-
relations as equality, mutual respect and interdependence were essential 
parts of the treaty. Furthermore, it provided for continued dialogue via 
three joint institutions: the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the Joint Assem-
bly and the Committee of Ambassadors.
8 
According to Gibb, Lomé was built on four principles: discrimination, non-
reciprocity, partnership and institutionalization.
9 It positively discriminated 
in favor of the former European colonies and was therefore a special and 
privileged relationship between the EU and the ACP states. Additionally, it 
was non-reciprocal in allowing free market access to the EU without de-
manding preferential access to the ACP markets in return.
10 The principle 
of partnership is shown in Article 2 of the Lomé Convention in “the right 
of each State to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic 
policy options”
11 which meant that each state was able to determine the 
purpose of the aid received by the EU and the areas for which it wanted to 
use it.
12 It created the idea of an equal relationship between developed and 
developing countries.
13  Institutionalization can be seen in the joint institu-
tions and as the raison d’être for the ACP Secretariat.
14 
 
7   See Cosgrove, p. 224. The imports for beef, veal, sugar, bananas and initially also 
rum were regulated by protocols, see Kerkelä, Leena; Niemi, Janne & Vaittinen, 
Risto: Renegotiating the Lome Convention: Trade Policy Schemes and their Effects 
for African Regions, 2000, available online at: http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/ 
conf/48Kerkela.pdf [29.02.2012], p. 1. 
8   See Crawford, Gordon, “Whither Lomé? The Mid-Term Review and the Decline of 
Partnership”, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1996), pp. 
503-518, p. 503. 
9   See Gibb, p.462. 
10  See ibid., p. 457. 
11   Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989, available 
online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1991:229: 
0003:0220:EN:PDF [29.03.2012]. 
12  See Crawford, p. 504. 
13  See Parfitt, Trevor, “The Decline of Eurafrica? Lomé’s Mid-Term Review”, in: 
Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996), pp. 53-66, p. 53. 
14  See Gibb, p. 462. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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In the fourth amendment of the Convention, a shift occurred which 
changed the importance of these principles. Lomé IV can even be seen as a 
departure from some of these concepts through the introduction of signifi-
cant modifications which severely altered the character of the Conventions. 
In this fourth Convention – which would be the last amendment of Lomé – 
the EU indicated that it was no longer in favor of preferential treatment for 
ACP states. This amendment was therefore an important step towards es-
tablishing a trade regime which would not discriminate between developing 
countries. The principle of sovereignty and equal partnership was diluted as 
the EU achieved to gain more control over the national programs by giving 
the European Commission a larger role in the administration of programs.
15 
Additionally, the EU managed to include a focus on human rights and fol-
lowing a revision in 1995 was able to emphasize further normative values 
such as democracy, through the ability to suspend development coopera-
tion. In theory, before suspension, there was a mechanism to look for a 
consensual solution. However, in practice, the EU suspended cooperation 
unilaterally with several countries.
16  
Not only such unilateralism evoked criticism but also unequal treatment of 
ACP countries and in particular a patronizing attitude that came to light in 
these suspensions.
17 This attitude is also visible in the new conditionality 
requirements the EU imposed: the recipient countries of assistance were 
required to adopt structural adjustment programs – economic policy 
schemes designed and advocated by the World Bank and the International 
 
15  See Crawford, p. 505.  
16  At the end of 1994, the EU had unilaterally suspended cooperation with eight states 
due to security problems or democracy and human rights issues: Gambia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Zaire, although the right to 
suspend cooperation was only introduced into the Convention in 1995 with Article 
366a. On this legal basis, the EU further sanctioned Niger, Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Simbabwe, see Parfitt, 1996, p. 57; Müller, Gisela et al.: Die 
Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union: Neue Ansätze und Perspektiven [The Africa 
policy of the European Union: new approaches and prospects], Opladen & Farming-
ton Hills 2007, p. 53.          
17  See Crawford, p. 510; Parfitt, p. 56. Claudia Rommel 
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Monetary Fund.
18 The relationship between the EU and ACP therefore 
turned out to be no different than any other donor relationship in which the 
donor imposes conditionality and direction over the use of funds.  
Another novelty of the amended Lomé Convention was decentralized co-
operation allowing the EU to work increasingly with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in addition to the formal cooperation via govern-
ments. Crawford voiced concern over this development as he saw it as a 
clear violation of the sovereignty principle and as a way of granting the 
Commission even more power.
19 In contrast to its predecessors, Lomé IV 
was valid for ten years instead of five. However, the financial commitments 
were to be negotiated in two trenches with a mid-term review in 1995. By 
the time of the review, it became apparent that the EU had lost much of its 
commitment: An agreement about the financial contributions was only 
reached at the very end of negotiations and was below the sum that the 
ACPs had expected.
20  
What had happened in the run up to the fourth Convention that made the 
result so different from the other three?  As the EU was less and less inter-
ested in the ACP region and blamed the region for having “misallocated 
and abused EU aid because they were generally corrupt, inefficient and au-
thoritarian”
21, it wanted more control over the funds. Control became more 
important than partnership and sovereignty. The ACP countries accepted 
the EU’s demands due to their different bargaining position in the 1980s as 
opposed to the 1970s. During negotiations of the first Lomé Treaty, the 
ACP countries profited from high prices of their export commodities such 
as coffee, sugar or food grains and from Europe’s sense of vulnerability 
due to the oil crisis which created its strong desire to remain a privileged 
trading partner in obtaining these commodities.
22  
 
18  See Parfitt, p. 55.  
19  See Crawford, p. 512. 
20  See Parfitt, p. 61; Crawford, p. 513.  
21  Parfitt, p. 56. 
22  See Gibb, p. 461. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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A decade later, the African continent had lost much of its negotiating pow-
er as a result of an economic recession.
23 Furthermore, for Europe it no 
longer appeared logical to group such diverse countries together.
24  
During the 1990s, there had already been indications that Lomé IV might 
be the last amendment of the Convention, especially as the EU shifted its 
interest increasingly towards its Eastern borders after the fall of Com-
munism in Europe.
25 Nevertheless, the main reason for not negotiating 
Lomé V came from outside Europe in form of the WTO. The WTO re-
quired the EU to negotiate agreements based on reciprocity. In particular 
the United States, along with several Latin American countries (Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico) challenged the EU’s preferential treat-
ment of the ACP countries.
26 In the dispute over the EU’s banana regime, 
the WTO ruled that the Lomé Convention was incompatible with WTO 
provisions and in particular violates Article I.1, the Most-Favoured Nation 
Treatment (MFN).
27  
As a consequence, the EU and ACP states applied for a waiver and were 
given a grace period until the expiry of Lomé IV on 29 February 2000 in 
order to come to an agreement in conformity with WTO rules.
28 The 
changes to the Convention, the focus on Eastern neighbors, and the WTO 
 
23  See Crawford, p. 506. 
24  See Parfitt, p. 65. 
25  See ibid., p. 65. 
26  See Salas & Jackson, p. 150. 
27 See Grynberg, Roman: The WTO incompatibility of the Lomé Convention trade 
provisions, 1998, p. 8, available online at: https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/ 
bitstream/1885/40346/3/sp98-3.pdf [16.03.2012]. The Most-Favoured Nation 
Treatment states that with “respect to customs duties and charges of any kind im-
posed on or in connection with the importation or exportation […] any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product orig-
inating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties”, The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf 
 [21.03.2012]. 
28  See Huber, Jürgen: The Past, Present and Future ACP-EC Trade Regime and the 
WTO, in: European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2000), pp. 427-
438, p. 430. Claudia Rommel 
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ruling caused the end of Lomé after twenty-five years. The assessment and 
the effect of Lomé during these years are contested. Undisputed is the fact 
that the Convention failed to fulfill the high expectations that it had raised 
in the beginning.
29 Nonetheless, the Convention exhibited some unique fea-
tures which made it innovative in its character: it was predictable in its du-
ration and the financial commitment by the EU and was based on the 
principle of equal partnership.
30 However, after the change from Lomé III 
to its last amendment, the Convention was not very different from other 
development programs in which the donor aims to influence the areas of 
spending.
31 Lomé was disappointing due to its limited effect on trade: over 
time, the share of EU imports from the ACP region constantly declined 
from 7 per cent in 1975 to 4.2 per cent in 1980 and 3.7 per cent in 1991.
32 
The globalization of international trade and the single market project of the 
EU both undermined the trade preferences given to the ACP states.
33 
The Lomé Convention was an important pillar of ACP-EU relations which 
over time has became an anachronistic aftermath of colonialism through 
the clear preference on former colonies. “When the Lomé Convention was 
signed it stood apart from the Community’s other trade relations in terms of 
the breath and boldness of its vision. Now it was just one of the EU’s trade 
agreements that provide some states with access to the European market 
 
29  Some expectations placed in Lomé might have been excessive. Carrington states 
that it is the responsibility of the EU to “assist[…] the economically weak countries 
of the South to reduce their economic dependence, and thereby enjoy a more mean-
ingful political independence”, Carrington, Edwin: The Lome Convention: Its sig-
nificance and relevance to the agenda for international economic cooperation, in: 
Trócaire Development Review (1987), available online at: 
http://www.trocaire.org/sites/trocaire/files/pdfs/tdr/DR1987_theLOMEConvention.
pdf [29.02.2012], pp. 7-16, p. 10. This statement assumes that the dependence of 
the ACP states is attributed mainly to external factors which can therefore only be 
abolished through changing external surroundings. Nevertheless, internal factors 
and policies play at least an equal role in achieving political emancipation. 
30   See Koulaïmah-Gabriel, p. 16f. 
31  See Crawford, p. 516. 
32  See Parfitt, p. 59. 
33   See Cosgrove, p. 245. 
 Economic Partnership Agreements 
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that is more liberal than that available under MFN treatment.”
34 In a critical 
assessment by the European Commission, the weaknesses of Lomé clearly 
outnumbered its strengths. On the plus side for Lomé were the considerable 
amount of funds that were invested into the framework, the improved liv-
ing conditions in the receiver countries, its uniqueness as a form of cooper-
ation between two groups of countries and the new ideas it provided 
through exchange. On the side of the weaknesses of the Convention, it is 
clearly stated that the “principle of partnership has proved difficult to carry 
through. Dependence on aid, short-termism and the pressure of crises, have 
increasingly overshadowed relations. The recipient country’s institutional 
environment and economic and social policy have often a major constraint 
on the effectiveness of Community cooperation.”
35 Additionally, the Com-
mission states that a lack of flexibility, complicated management and the 
automated granting of funds have impeded the efficiency of the Lomé 
Convention. While its weaknesses inhibited its ability to play a significant 
role in trade promotion and constrained its efficiency, its institutionaliza-
tion achieved solidarity among the ACP countries and regular exchange 
with the EU.
36 
  
 
34   Stevens, Christopher; McQueen, Matthew & Kennan, Jane: After Lomé IV: A 
Strategy for ACP-EU Relations in the 21st Century, 1998, p. 16, available online at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1118776867573 
 /afterlome.pdf  [23.03.2012]. 
35   European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament: Guidelines for the negotiation of new cooperation agree-
ments with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, COM(97) 537 fi-
nal, 29 October 1997, p. 7 cited in: Holland, Martin: 20/20 Vision? The EU’s 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, in: The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. IX, 
No. 2 (2003), pp. 161-175, p. 161f. 
36   See ibid., p. 7. Claudia Rommel 
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2.  The EU’s post-Lomé Trade Regime  
The following part is going to have a quick look at the Cotonou Agreement 
which followed Lomé. It will then turn to the general EU trade regime and 
the EPAs which are provided for in Cotonou. 
2.1 The Successor Agreement 
A successor to Lomé proved difficult to negotiate and the two sides could 
only consent in February 2000 – weeks before Lomé IV expired – to the 
‘Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States of the one part and the European Community 
and its Member States of the other part’ also called the Cotonou Agree-
ment, to be valid for twenty years.
37 Cotonou links politics, aid and trade 
and retained many elements of Lomé.
38 Among the innovations of Cotonou 
is the emphasis on political dialogue where both parties assess the respect 
for democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance.
39 Further-
more, mutual obligations are stressed, as well as the participation of non-
state actors. These actors are integrated in the process of deciding on na-
tional programs and in their implementation by being direct receivers of 
funds. The private sector in particular is expected to play an important role 
in the future.
40 The main paradigm shift from Lomé is in the area of trade: 
Cotonou displays a clear commitment to free trade. The idea of negotiating 
and establishing relationships with several regions and not just one group, 
was first suggested in 1996 in a Green Paper by the European Commission 
 
37  See European Commission EuropeAid: The Cotonou Agreement, available online 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/ 
index_en.htm [03.04.2012]; Huber, p. 431. The agreement was initially planned to 
be signed in Suva, Fiji, however, due to a coup in Fiji, the ceremony had to be re-
scheduled and moved to the capital of Benin, see Holland, p. 164. 
38   See Holland, pp. 164, 174.  
39   See Babarinde, Olufemi & Faber, Gerrit: From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as Usu-
al? 2003, available online at: http://aei.pitt.edu/2817/1/084.pdf [29.03.2012], p. 19f.  
40  See Hurt, Stephen R.: Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement be-
tween the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention, in: 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2003), pp. 161-176, p. 172. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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and is incorporated into the Cotonou Agreement.
41 So-called Economic 
Partnership Agreements are to be negotiated and are to replace the trade 
chapters of the Cotonou Agreement, which could stay in place until 2008 
owing to a WTO waiver. The EU therefore had initially intended to have 
concluded Economic Partnership Agreements by the end of this transition 
period.  
2.2 The current EU Trade Regime and Economic Partnership   
Agreements  
Economic Partnership Agreements are basically free trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, the EU is anxious to underline that they are in fact “not free 
trade agreements in the classic sense”
42 since they will be phased in over 
long periods of time and certain sensitive products can be excluded.
43 It is 
not surprising that the EU wishes to avoid EPAs being mentioned in the 
same breath as free trade agreements; after all, free trade agreements in 
general and in particular among such uneven partners have caused a lot of 
controversy in the past.
44 Nonetheless, free trade agreements even in the 
classic sense do not necessarily apply to all goods and often include a tran-
sitional phase (NAFTA was phased-in over 15 years) and safeguard claus-
es. According to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), EPAs have to cover “substantially all the trade” within a 
“reasonable length of time”.
45 The wording therefore leaves room for inter-
 
41   See Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries 
on the eve of the 21st century: Challenges and options for a new partnership, 
COM(96) 570 final, available online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0570:FIN:EN:PDF [10.04.2012], p. 44f. 
42   EU offers full market access to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regions in EPAs ne-
gotiations, 4 April 2007, online available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2007/september/tradoc_135911.pdf [16.04.2012]. 
43   See ibid.; Hurt, p. 168. 
44  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example for such a 
treaty which includes partners of very different economic weight and which has 
caused much dispute within the single countries. 
45   The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV 5.(c); 8.(b), 
available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf 
[21.03.2012]. Claudia Rommel 
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pretation. Stevens states that by the use of other trade agreements and WTO 
statements, these conditions can be specified. The ACP countries will 
probably be able to exclude about 20 per cent of goods from the liberaliza-
tion scheme, whereas a reasonable timeframe could be a twelve year period 
as in the agreement of the EU with Tunisia or South Africa.
46 As the EU 
intended to have completed EPAs with seven ACP regions by 2008, they 
would have expired together with the Cotonou Agreement in 2020. How-
ever, this proved to be an overly optimistic plan. In the beginning of 2012, 
4 years after the expiration of the WTO waiver for the trade chapters of Co-
tonou, the Caribbean is the only region which has completed an EPA. 
Where a full EPA with a region is not yet possible, the EU has advanced 
with single countries or a ‘coalition of the willing’ for the adoption of inter-
im or stepping stone agreements.  
In the Pacific, the EU has signed an interim EPA with Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji. Several members of the South African Development Community 
(SADC) have also concluded stepping stone agreements: Botswana, Leso-
tho, Swaziland and Mozambique. The East African Community (EAC) and 
the EU have consented to an interim agreement but it has neither been 
signed nor ratified while negotiations for a comprehensive treaty continue. 
With the region of Eastern and Southern Africa
47 the EU has signed provi-
sional EPAs with Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Madagascar and in 
Central Africa with Cameroon.  
 
46  See Stevens, Christopher: The EU, Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements: 
unintended consequences of policy leverage, in: Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol. 44, No. 3 (2006), pp. 441-458, p. 444; 
Zouhon-Bi, Simplice G. & Nielsen, Lynge: ECOWAS – Fiscal Revenue Implica-
tions of the Prospective Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, in: The 
World Bank Africa Region Working Paper Series, No. 103 (2007), available online 
at: http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp103.pdf [23.04.2012], p. 8. 
47  Eastern and Southern Africa includes: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are the two countries in West Africa which have 
concluded interim EPAs; while the agreement with Côte d’Ivoire has been 
signed, both have not been ratified so far.
48  
Once it became clear that it would not be possible to conclude the agree-
ments within the desired period, the EU passed Regulation 1528/2007. In 
order to avoid trade disruption, the so-called Market Access Regulation 
grants duty and quota-free access to countries which are currently negotiat-
ing EPAs.
49 In 2011, the European Commission proposed to amend this 
regulation and increase pressure on the negotiations through setting a time 
limit for the signing and ratification of EPAs. According to the Commis-
sion, the Regulation – thought of as a temporary solution – provided 
enough time for the ratification of an agreement. It therefore intends to 
withdraw the market access offer by January 2014.
50 If the Commission’s 
proposal is approved by the Council and the Parliament, countries that have 
not concluded EPAs by 2014 will trade with the EU under the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP).  
The GSP is a trade regime which is exempted from the rules of the WTO 
(in particular the MFN and the requirement of reciprocity) and is designed 
for developing countries. Those ACP states that are not subject to the Mar-
ket Access Regulation already trade under the GSP regime. The aim of the 
GSP is to reduce poverty and foster development by granting preferential 
market access to certain groups of developing countries. It is a result of a 
proposal from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1968 and the EU developed the scheme in 1971.  
 
48   See European Commission DG TRADE: Overview of EPA, 3 January 2012, avail-
able online at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_ 
144912.pdf [16.04.2012]. 
49  See Council Regulation 1528/2007 available online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
   lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:348:0001:0154: 
    EN:PDF [16.04.2012], Annex I lists the states which benefit from this regulation.  
    Transition periods applied for rice and sugar. The last restriction on rice was lifted 
in the beginning of 2010.  
50   See Access to EU markets for exporters from African, Caribbean and Pacific Coun-
tries, online available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/september 
/tradoc_148215.pdf [04.04.2012].  Claudia Rommel 
16 
 
GSP comprises three provisions: the General GSP, the GSP+ and the Eve-
rything But Arms initiative (EBA). The latter offers duty and quota free 
market access to the EU for all products from least-developed countries 
(LDCs) with the exception of arms and ammunition. 48 States currently 
benefit from the initiative; the majority of which (40 states) are from Afri-
ca, the Caribbean and the Pacific.
51 The General GSP covers about 7000 
products which can enter the EU market duty free. Whenever the share of 
the EU market of a product from a developing country represents 15 per 
cent or more of the exports from this country, the benefits from GSP will 
cease to apply for this product. The increased share is seen as a success of 
the GSP scheme which then has fulfilled its purpose and promoted the ex-
ports of this country. GSP+ is of interest for developing countries whose 
economy is vulnerable in the sense that it is not diversified. In order to take 
account of the situation of these countries, GSP+ is more favorable than the 
General GSP. Countries are eligible when their five largest sections repre-
sent more than 75 per cent of the exports of the country to the EU under 
GSP and if the GSP-covered exports to the EU represent less than 1 per 
cent of total GSP-covered EU imports. Additionally, countries must have 
ratified and implemented a list of conventions on human rights, governance 
and environmental protection.
52 Currently, 16 countries benefit from the 
provisions of GSP+, among these, Cape Verde is the only country from the 
ACP and benefits from GSP+ since December 2011.
53 
 
51   See European Commission DG TRADE: Generalised System of Preferences: Eve-
rything But Arms, online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-
agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/ 
[18.04.2012]. 
52   See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Re-
port on the status of ratification and recommendations by monitoring bodies con-
cerning conventions listed in Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences pursuant to Article 8(3) of this 
Regulation, 17.5.2011 COM(2011) 271 final, available online at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0271:FIN:EN:PDF 
[18.04.2012]. 
53   See European Commission DG TRADE: Cape Verde secures access to EU markets 
and boosts its development, 9 December 2011, available online at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=763 [27.04.2012]. Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
17 
 
Eager to prevent criticism about the concept of EPAs, the EU emphasizes 
their advantages for developing countries. Compared to the alternative 
scheme, the GSP, an EPA is not a unilateral offer by the EU but an agree-
ment between two partners. It is more stable because an EPA is treaty-
based and thus not subject to regular review, it is wider ranging, offers bet-
ter EU market access and is more ambitious.
54 Clearly, for the non-LDCs, 
EPAs are the better choice. However, for those 40 ACP countries which are 
eligible to benefit from the EBA initiative, the choice between EPA and 
EBA is not clear. EBA is a very attractive scheme for LDCs in particular as 
EBA does not require the opening of their markets while benefitting from 
access to the EU’s market. An EPA is based on reciprocity which will lead 
to a loss in tariff revenue for LDCs once the phasing-in period is over. 
Consequently, for many LDCs, EBA might be the more interesting option 
to choose. However, difficulties could arise when these countries are a 
member of a regional trading arrangement (RTA) which aims to be, or al-
ready is, a customs union. The reason is the loss of sovereignty over trade 
policy which results from a common external trade policy. An EPA will 
result in free access of EU exports to the market of the region, irrespective 
of whether a particular LDC in the RTA has opted for the EPA or the EBA 
initiative. Consequently, LDCs that remain members of an agreement and 
opt for EBA can de facto not make use of the initiative if the market access 
of the EU to the region is regulated by an EPA.
55 This could be the reason 
why the EPA with West Africa is not progressing: twelve of sixteen coun-
tries are least-developed countries and already have very comfortable mar-
ket access provisions for trading with the EU under EBA.
56 Their 
comfortable trading conditions are likely to be jeopardized by an EPA.  
In the next part, we will look at the negotiations for an Economic Partner-
ship Agreement between the EU and West Africa in more detail.  
 
54  See Trade for development: EU fully opens its market to African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries, online available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/ 
january/tradoc_145752.pdf [19.04.2012]. 
55   See Babarinde & Faber, p. 23ff. 
56   See ibid., p. 25. Claudia Rommel 
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2.3 Negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement between 
the EU and West Africa  
The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with the 15 members of the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mauritania. 
West Africa was along with Central Africa the first region to initiate EPA 
negotiations. They opened on 6
th October 2003 in Cotonou, Benin in the 
presence of the EU Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, the Commis-
sioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson, the President 
of Benin, Mathieu Kérékou, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mo-
hammed Ibn Chambas, and the Commissioner for Trade of the Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), Soumaïla Cissé.
57 
The ECOWAS and UEMOA Commission were given the mandate to lead 
the negotiations with the EU. For the EU, trade with West Africa is of mar-
ginal importance whereas the EU is West Africa’s main commercial part-
ner.
58 The two parties have an overall balanced trade where the EU exports 
mostly industrial goods and vehicles, e.g. chemical products, rubber and 
heavy equipments in return for oil (from Nigeria) and agricultural products 
such as bananas, pineapples, wood, cocoa and cotton.
59 An EPA between 
the EU and West Africa will in any case have a greater effect on the West 
African economy than on the European. The ECOWAS delegation is there-
fore careful to negotiate an agreement which is beneficial for the region. 
There are several concerns that have to be taken into account. The major 
concern of West Africa is the loss of fiscal revenue arising from lowering 
 
57   See EU-ACPs: opening of trade negotiations with West and Central Africa, 2 Octo-
ber 2003, available online at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/ 
tradoc_113878.pdf [19.04.2012]. 
58 See Kone, Youssouf: Economic and Social Impacts of the Prospective EU-
ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreements: The Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, 
2008, available online at: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/ 
download/3876.pdf [24.04.2012], p. 7. 
59  See Adenikinju, Adeola F. & Alaba, Olumuyiwa B.: EU-ACP Economic Partner-
ship Agreements: Implication for Trade and Development in West Africa, 2005, 
available online at: http://hubrural.ak-project.com/IMG/pdf/adenikinju_alaba.pdf 
[23.04.2012], p. 5; The EU and Côte d’Ivoire sign stepping stone trade deal, 26 
November 2008, available online at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/ 
november/tradoc_141437.pdf [25.04.2012]. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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or abolishing tariffs. Despite trade liberalization measures in the past, in-
come from import and export duties continues to play a significant role in 
overall national budgets. The countries of ECOWAS collect on average 15 
per cent of government revenue from import duties.
60 Busse and Großmann 
calculated that liberalization resulting from EPA will decrease government 
revenue by 4 to 7 per cent and will particularly affect Ghana, Gambia and 
Cape Verde.
61 Lang showed that Ghana and Guinea-Bissau could even lose 
up to 20 per cent of their national budget revenue from the loss of import 
duties.
62 In order to compensate for this loss, ECOWAS needs to diversify 
its tax system and in particular increase its efficiency: the import duty col-
lection efficiency amounts to only about 67 per cent on average.
63  
Another concern of West Africa is the effect an EPA may have on trade. It 
is desirable in any free trade agreement that trade is created while trade di-
version is kept to a minimum. Trade diversion means that trade is merely 
shifted from a country not participating in the free trade agreement to a par-
ticipating country. In the case of West Africa, trade diversion would occur 
if producers from non-EU countries were replaced by less efficient suppli-
ers from the EU. Trade diversion reduces welfare as the replacement of im-
porters occurrs only due to the preferential treatment. Trade creation on the 
other hand occurs when new trade flows are created due to tariff reduc-
tions.
64 
 
60   See Adenikinju & Alaba, p. 16. 
61   See Busse, Matthias & Großmann, Harald: The trade and fiscal impact of EU/ACP 
economic partnership agreements on West African countries, in: Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2007), pp. 787-811, p. 808. 
62  See Lang, Rémi: A partial equilibrium analysis of the impact of ECOWAS-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement, 2006, available online at: 
http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/uneca_partial_equilibrium_analysis_of_impact_
of_ecowas_eu_epa.pdf [24.04.2012], p. 28. 
63   See Adenikinju & Alaba, p. 16. 
64   See Zouhon-Bi & Nielsen, p. 9f.; Calí, Massimiliano & Willem te Velde, Dirk: The 
Potential Effects of Economic Partnership Agreements: What Quantitative Models 
Say, in: Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper, June 2006, available 
online at: http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/22876/1/ 
 The%20Potential%20Effects%20of%20Economic%20Partnership%20Agreements
%20What%20Quantitative%20Models%20Say.pdf?1 [20.04.2012], p. 2.  Claudia Rommel 
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 Several studies concluded that an EPA between the EU and West Africa 
would lead to more trade creation than trade diversion.
65 Nevertheless, sev-
eral measures can reduce trade diversion effects even further. West African 
countries are advised to reduce their tariffs to non-EU importers in parallel 
with the preferential treatment of the EU.
66 This would maintain competi-
tion between the EU and other producers ensuring that lower prices are 
passed on to the West African customers as consumer surplus.
67 West Afri-
can policy-makers are particularly concerned that EPAs might exert pres-
sure on their already low manufacturing capacities. While on the one hand, 
the manufacturing sector can benefit from lower tariffs and thus reduced 
costs of input materials, the sector might be left vulnerable and exposed to 
European competition. Possible implications would be the closure of facto-
ries and displacement of workers. It is therefore important to ensure that the 
EPA does not endanger the industrialization efforts of West African coun-
tries. This is of particular importance as there is a strong interrelationship 
between the degree of industrialization and the level of development and 
poverty reduction.
68 Therefore, West Africa needs to choose wisely which 
sectors need to be protected and excluded from the EPA and which policies 
can support industrialization. The phase-in time of the EPA has to be used 
by the respective countries to implement reforms which will ease the ef-
fects of liberalization.  
We have seen that adequate policy measures may increase the positive im-
pacts of an agreement and in general that West Africa could benefit from a 
more liberalized trade relationship with the EU. However the question is 
whether these benefits are enough for West Africa to conclude an EPA. 
 
65   See i.a. Calí; Busse & Großmann; Lang. 
66   See Busse & Großmann, p. 809. 
67   Andriamananjara, Soamiely; Brenton, Paul; Uexküll, Jan Erik von & Walkenhorst, 
Peter: Assessing the Economic Impacts of an Economic Partnership Agreement on 
Nigeria, in: The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4920 (2009), 
available online at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver 
 /download/4920.pdf?expires=1335436555&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=58
E50A72DE4BAF1FD811108EC74CEDF4 [26.04.2012], p. 3, whereas a dominant 
supplier might choose to maintain high prices despite tariff reductions. 
68   See Adenikinju & Alaba, pp. 3, 9, 17. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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The following part deals with the interests West Africa has in such an 
agreement. Within the region, only Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Cape 
Verde do not qualify as LDCs. The other eleven ECOWAS member states 
and Mauritania already have quota and duty free access to the EU market 
under the EBA initiative. What would be their incentive to negotiate an 
EPA and as a result having to open their markets to the EU as well? The 
EU cannot answer this. It merely states in the Market Access Regulation 
that instead of trading under EBA, “it is preferable that those least-
developed countries which are also ACP States base their future trade rela-
tionship with the Community on Economic Partnership Agreements. In or-
der to facilitate such a development, it is appropriate to provide that such 
countries which […] can benefit from the arrangements provided under this 
Regulation may continue to benefit, for a limited period of time, from the 
special arrangements for least-developed countries […] in respect of those 
products where the transitional arrangements set out in this Regulation are 
less favourable.”
69  
The difference between an EPA and the EBA initiative apart from the 
scope and reciprocal market access is the technical and financial support 
given to EPA signature countries and the rules of origin. These rules are 
likely to be stricter under EBA requiring the LDCs to use fewer input mate-
rials from other countries.
70 Even so, these slight differences cannot ob-
scure the fact that the EU seems to be the major beneficiary if LDCs 
choose an EPA instead of trading under EBA: it would allow the EU to 
have free access to the market of these countries.
71 Calí states that for “the 
ACP countries that are LDCs [… an EPA] is de facto the elimination of 
tariffs on EU imports as they already have tariff-free access in the EU 
through Everything But Arms”.
72 Somehow, the question of incentives for 
LDCs has not been properly addressed in the construction of EPAs. Turn-
ing to the four countries in West Africa which are not LDCs, we can see 
 
69   Regulation 1528/2007 (7). 
70   See Busse & Großmann, p. 789.  
71   See Adenikinju & Alaba, p. 9f. 
72   Calí, p. 2. Claudia Rommel 
22 
 
that Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire profit from individual EPAs or rather from 
the Market Access Regulation since the agreements have not yet been rati-
fied. A Ghanaian trade expert, Augustine Adongo, explains why his coun-
try pressed ahead: “To harmonise the interest of all 16 West African 
countries would not have been the best for Ghana as interests differ from 
country to country”
 73. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire can profit greatly from an 
EPA as they aim to secure the European market for their agricultural ex-
ports. However, it will not be easy to negotiate an EPA which covers all the 
differing interests of the individual West African countries. Cape Verde 
benefits from the GSP+ scheme and so far has not attempted to negotiate an 
individual agreement. 
The same is true for Nigeria which has so far avoided any talk about con-
cluding an individual EPA.
74 The country already exports the majority of 
its goods (95 per cent) duty free to Europe and has on the other hand re-
strictive trade policies with high import tariffs. Nigeria in fact has more to 
lose from liberalizing the Nigerian economy than it has to gain in form of 
market access. Furthermore, the importance of Europe as a destination for 
Nigerian exports has been decreasing as the share of exports to India and 
China has increased steadily.
75 It is therefore not surprising that Nigeria has 
no interest in negotiating an individual EPA. It seems that the West African 
countries are more or less satisfied with the status-quo. Interestingly, apart 
from urging its member states to take the necessary steps to conclude an 
agreement with the EU, the issue of an EPA was hardly discussed at the 
last meeting of West African heads of state and government.
76 It has been 
 
73  Daily Graphic: Interim EPA Not A Threat, 22 January 2008, available online at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137721.pdf 
[20.04.2012]. 
74   See Ivory Coast says EPA deal will lead way for region, 13 February 2008, availa-
ble online at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137752. 
pdf [27.04.2012]. 
75   See Andriamananjara et al., p. 2ff.  
76   ECOWAS: 40th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, 16-17 February 2012, Final Communiqué, available online at: 
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/communique_final/40eme/comfinal.pdf 
[30.04.2012]. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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shown that the degree of interest in concluding an agreement with the EU 
varies greatly among the individual West African countries. The countries 
have different priorities about the sectors which demand protection, they 
possess different trading schemes after Lomé and have diverging views on 
the content and necessity of negotiating EPAs. It is possible that ECOWAS 
is split between those that are willing to liberalize towards the EU and 
those that are unwilling. Stevens sees clear evidence that EPAs may weak-
en regionalism and regional integration.
77 In fact, negotiations of an EPA 
can only be successful if LDCs abstain from using the EBA initiative and 
are willing to open their economies to “highly competitive (and possibly 
dumped) EU imports.”
78 Whether ECOWAS will successfully negotiate an 
agreement with the EU will depend on whether the West African countries 
choose the same option: to accede to an EPA and not trade under GSP. 
Much also depends on whether economic integration is a priority within the 
region. As soon as ECOWAS completes a customs union, LDCs lose their 
ability to trade under EBA, as high border controls are not feasible. Until 
then, the majority of West African countries trade comfortably under EBA, 
while Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have market access under the regulation 
until at least 2014, Cape Verde managed to be one of the beneficiaries un-
der GSP+ and Nigeria shows little interest in offering market access to the 
EU under an agreement. Only if regional integration is a top priority, is an 
EPA necessary and imperative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77   See Stevens, 2006, p. 441ff. 
78   Ibid., p. 446. Claudia Rommel 
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Conclusion 
The spirit of the relationship between ACP countries and the EU has 
changed considerably from Lomé to the current regime. In fact, the present 
development of Economic Partnership Agreements is the continuation of 
the changes which were already introduced in the last amendment of the 
Convention. The trade regime with developing countries is also the result 
of the learning process of Lomé, which had most disappointing effects on 
trade. Where unilateral market access has not achieved the desired results, 
reciprocity guarantees the WTO’s blessing and presents another approach 
in the design of trade agreements with developing countries. While Lomé 
was clearly shaped by colonial ties which resulted in preferential treatment 
and market access to the EU, the current trade regime has overcome the 
colonial past and offers all developing countries market access under GSP. 
With the ACP states, the EU is in the process of negotiating reciprocal 
agreements; a movement that has caused much criticism in developing 
countries, in particular among protectionists, who believe that reciprocal 
trade can only harm these countries. Studies and surveys reach a different 
conclusion: Trade liberalization can benefit developing countries if certain 
measures and policies are implemented which cushion its negative effects.  
However the unresolved issue is the different interests of the individual 
countries. This can clearly be shown in West Africa. Many West African 
states do not feel the urge of completing an agreement with the EU as soon 
as possible. Furthermore, preferences over which goods to protect vary 
substantially. An EPA therefore might only be realizable when West Africa 
has progressed to form a customs union. Considering that the deadline for 
the customs union has been moved several times, it is unclear whether 
ECOWAS will have implemented a customs union according to schedule 
by the end of 2012, despite the progress made in the last years. The level of 
economic integration within West Africa is therefore closely related to its 
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